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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Tyrell Lee Ramsey appeals from his judgment of conviction for battery 
with intent to commit rape, sexual penetration with a foreign object, and 
misdemeanor battery. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
At a party Ramsey cornered L.N. in a bathroom, told her "this is going to 
happen," groped her breast, and put his hand down her pants, all over her 
protests and requests that he stop. (Trial Tr., p. 233, L. 12 - p. 240, L. 6. 1) L.N. 
managed to escape out of the bathroom. (Trial Tr., p. 240, Ls. 7-16.) Later at 
the same party Ramsey pulled S.P. from a back porch to the side of the house 
where he pressed her against the wall of the house, told her she wanted to do 
this when she told him she did not, pinned her to the ground, overcame her 
physical resistance and pulled down her pants, grabbed her by the throat and 
told her he would kill her, inserted a finger in her vagina, and tried to force his 
erect penis into her vagina until she screamed for help. (12/28/09 Tr., p. 148, L. 
18 - p. 153, L. 23.) When other people at the party came in response to the 
scream, Ramsey fled. (Trial Tr., p. 300, L. 2 - p. 307, L. 6.) 
The state charged Ramsey with one count of attempted forcible rape of 
L.N., one count of attempted forcible rape of S.P, one count of battery with intent 
·, The transcript herein referenced as 'Trial Tr." includes two pre-trial motion 
hearings and all but day one of the jury trial. Other transcripts in the record will 
be referenced by date. 
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to commit a serious felony on L.N., one count of battery with intent to commit a 
serious felony on S.P., and one count of sexual penetration of S.P. with a foreign 
object. (R., vol. I, pp. 62-65.) The matter proceeded to trial (R., vol. I, pp. 228-
34, 239-50; R., vol. II, pp. 251-68), at the conclusion of which the jury found 
Ramsey guilty of one count of battery with intent to commit the rape of S.P., 
sexual penetration of S.P. with a foreign object, and misdemeanor battery of L.N. 
(R., vol. II, pp. 268, 271-73). The jury acquitted Ramsey of the greater offenses 
of battery with intent to commit rape and attempted rape of L.N. and reached no 
verdict as to the charge of attempted rape of S.P. (R., vol. II, pp. 271-73.) The 
district court imposed concurrent sentences of 180 days jail for the misdemeanor 
battery, 15 years with five years determinate on the battery with intent to commit 
rape, and 15 years with seven years fixed for sexual penetration with a foreign 
object. (R., pp. 372-75.) Ramsey timely appealed. (R., pp. 391-98.) 
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Because Ramsey's 
questions, it is not repeated 
submits that the issues are: 
JSSUES 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.) The state 
1. During the trial the jury inquired what would happen if it could not reach a 
unanimous verdict. The court instructed the jury to continue deliberations 
under the instructions already given. Has Ramsey failed to show 
fundamental error in the district court's instruction that the jury continue 
deliberations? 
2. The district court denied Ramsey's motion to sever the counts related to 
victim L.N. from the counts related to victim S.P. because the crimes were 
connected and part of a common scheme or plan. Has Ramsey shown no 
error in the district court's order denying his motion to sever? 
3. Is Ramsey's claim of excessive bail not reviewable on appeal because it 
did not affect the fairness of the trial? 
4. For the first time on appeal Ramsey alleges that the 15 day delay between 
the initial denial of his motion for an investigator at state expense and the 
granting of that motion on reconsideration deprived him of a fair trial. Has 
Ramsey failed to show error in the timing of the district court's order 
granting state funds to hire an investigator? 
5. Is Ramsey's claim of error in denial of his motion for funds to hire a 
psychiatrist waived because it is unsupported by any legal authority? 
6. Ramsey moved to present testimony from one witness that on one 
occasion victim S.P. initiated a sexual encounter with him by dropping her 
pants and telling him to "come on." Has Ramsey shown no error in the 
district court's exclusion of this purported evidence related to S.P's sexual 
history? 
7. Has Ramsey failed to show that the district court erred when it concluded 
it lacked authority to order P. to allow the defense access to her home? 
8. During trial the district court sustained objections to questions to Ramsey 
regarding whether S.P. had inquired about dating him. Has Ramsey has 
failed to show error in the district court's rulings? 
9. Has Ramsey failed to show fundamental error in the jury selection 
process? 
3 
10. Ramsey encourages this Court to make credibility determinations contrary 
to those made by the jury. Has Ramsey failed to show that the evidence 
was insufficient to support his conviction? 





Ramsey Has Shown No Fundamental Error in The District Court's Instruction 
That The Jury Continue Deliberations 
A Introduction 
After the commencement of deliberations the jury sent an inquiry to the 
district court, as follows: "What happens if we do not have a unanimous decision 
on Instruction #28?" (R., vol. II, p. 269; Trial Tr., p. 802, L 19 - p. 803, L 9.) 
Instruction 28 was the elements instruction on the charge of battery with intent to 
commit rape on victim S.P. (R., vol. II, p. 297.) The district court declined to infer 
from the question that the jury was in fact deadlocked. (Trial Tr., p. 808, L. 1 O -
p. 809, L. 11.) The court answered: "The jury is to continue its deliberations 
under the direction of the instructions that have been given." (R., vol. II, p. 270.) 
Although counsel for the defense expressed some concern that the jury might be 
deadlocked (Trial Tr., p. 806, L. 16- p. 808, L. 1), when asked if the defense had 
an objection to its proposed response counsel responded, "No" (Trial Tr., p. 809, 
Ls. 20-22). 
On appeal Ramsey argues that, despite the lack of objection, this Court 
should review as fundamental error the question of whether the district court 
erred by not inquiring of the jury whether it deadlocked and instead instructing it 
to continue deliberations. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-21.) Ramsey's argument is 
without merit; he has failed to show error, much less fundamental error. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether 
the issue was preserved is a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 
457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989). 
C. Ramsey Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error 
A claim of error unpreserved for appellate review by a timely objection 
may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes fundamental error." State v. 
Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). In the 
absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to remedy that error is 
strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being 
deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a 
fair tribunal." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). 
Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that 
"one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated;" (2) 
the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for 
any additional information" including information "as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must demonstrate that the 
error affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a 
reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial court 
proceedings." l9..,, at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Ramsey's claim of fundamental error 
fails on all three of the elements required by Perry. 
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First, Ramsey has failed to demonstrate that the district court's answer to 
the jury's question violated his "unwaived constitutional rights." k;l He has cited 
no authority for his claim that a district court has a constitutional duty to inquire 
whether a jury is deadlocked, much less one that would require such an inquiry 
under the circumstances of this case. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 
P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (arguments unsupported by authority "will not be 
considered" on appeal). His claim that the court gave a "dynamite" instruction 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16) is incorrect because the instruction did not exhort 
the minority jurors to reconsider their position. State v. Pullin, 152 Idaho 82, _ 
n.1, 266 P.3d 1187, 1189 n.1 (Ct. App. 2011) (a dynamite instruction "exhorts 
those jurors holding a minority view to reconsider their position"). Even if the 
instruction could be considered a "dynamite" instruction, the claimed error is not 
constitutional. k;l at_, 266 P.3d at 1189-91 (to show constitutional violation 
appellant claiming fundamental error must show actual coercion of jury verdict). 
Because Ramsey has failed to show any constitutional error, his claim fails under 
the first prong of the fundamental error standard. 
Pullin's claim also fails on the second prong of the fundamental error 
standard, that the error be clear on the record and without the need for additional 
information, including information as to whether the lack of objection was a 
tactical decision. Here there is nothing in the record to suggest coercion of an 
actually deadlocked jury. Likewise, the defense statement that it had no 
objection to the district court's answer appears to have been a tactical choice to 
let the jury continue to deliberate in hopes that it would acquit. 
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Finally, Ramsey has failed to show prejudice. The instruction to the jury 
was merely to continue deliberating. Ramsey's assertion that the jury may have 
ended up hung is merest speculation, not demonstrated prejudice. 
Ramsey has failed to show fundamental error in the district court's answer 
to the jury question. His complaint that the court gave a dynamite instruction is 
both wrong and not a claim of constitutional error and therefore fails the first 
prong of the fundamental error test. In addition, the record in no way clearly 
shows a deadlocked jury or that the defense did not make the tactical decision to 
allow deliberations to continue in hopes of a hung jury or acquittal. Finally, 
because the record does not show that the district court's answer to the jury 
changed the eventual verdict Ramsey has shown no prejudice. 
11. 
Ramsey Has Shown No Error In The District Court's Order Denying His Motion 
To Sever 
A Introduction 
Ramsey moved to sever charges related to victim LN. from charges 
related to victim S.P. (R., vol. I, pp. 81-82; Trial Tr., p. 13, L 14 - p. 18, L 15.) 
The prosecution opposed the motion, contending that the crimes were 
interrelated and part of a common scheme or plan. (Trial Tr., p. 26, L. 13 - p. 29, 
L. 22.) The factors cited by the prosecutor included that the assaults happened 
on the same night, in the same residence, at the same party, and to similar 
victims in a relatively short sequence, and that the evidence for both was largely 
the same because Ramsey was questioned about both assaults in the same 
interview and some of the same witnesses would be called as to the assaults 
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against both victims. (Trial Tr., p. 27, L. 2 - p. 28, L. 25.) The court denied the 
motion to sever, concluding the charged offenses were "sufficiently connected 
together by time, location, and event" and that Ramsey would not "suffer 
prejudice if the counts are not severed." (R., vol. !, pp. 102-04.) 
On appeal Ramsey argues the district court abused its discretion. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 22-27.) Application of the relevant law to the facts of this 
case shows no error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether counts are properly joined is a question of law given free review. 
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 564, 165 P.3d 273, 278 (2007). A motion to sever 
properly joined counts because of prejudice, however, is directed to the trial 
court's discretion. kt at 564-65, 165 P.3d at 278-79; State v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho 
903, 907, 55 P.3d 896, 900 (Ct. App. 2002). 
C. Ramsey Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Conclusion That 
The Counts Were Connected And Part Of A Common Scheme Or Plan 
Counts are properly joined in a single charging document if they are either 
"based on the same act or transaction" or, if based on different acts or 
transactions, those acts or transactions are "connected together or constituting 
parts of a common scheme or plan." I.C.R. B(a). "Two crimes are 'connected' 
together if the proof of one crime constitutes a substantial portion of the proof of 
the other." United States v. Montes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d 771, 776 (11 th Cir., 
1984). "In determining whether the connection between the acts charged is 
sufficient to meet the requirements of joinder under Rule 8(a), the court should 
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be guided by the extent of evidentiary overlap." United States v. Berardi, 675 
F.2d 894, 899-900 (ih Cir., 1982). "Cases discussing common plans have 
focused on whether the offenses were one continuing action or whether the 
offenses have sufficient common elements including the type of sexual abuse, 
the circumstances under which the abuse occurred, and the age of the victims." 
Field, 144 Idaho at 565, 165 P.3d at 279. "Whether joinder is proper is 
determined by what is alleged, not what the proof eventually shows." Field, 144 
Idaho at 565, 165 P.3d at 279. 
The purpose of joinder is to promote judicial efficiency and "conserve state 
funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid 
delays in bringing those accused of crime to trial." United States v. Lane, 474 
U.S. 438, 449 (1986) (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 
(1968)). For these reasons, federal courts and other state courts broadly 
construe their nearly identical rules in favor of joinder. United States v. Rock, 
282 F.3d 548, 552 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting federal rule 8(a) is broadly construed in 
favor of joinder); State v. Reeder, 182 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) 
(noting that "liberal joinder" is favored in the interest of judicial economy). 
The district court's determination that the charges were connected 
together and part of a common scheme or plan is correct. The district court 
concluded that, as pied, "all five of the alleged offenses occurred on the same 
night, at the same house, and at the same party." (R., vol. I, p. 103.) They are 
connected "by time, location and event." (Id.) The charges are essentially the 
same crimes committed against sequential victims in the same course of events. 
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When Ramsey failed to obtain what he wanted from the first victim he assaulted 
the second. Ramsey has failed to show that the district court erred by concluding 
the counts were properly joined. 
Even where charges are properly joined, however, a motion to sever may 
still be granted if the party making the motion demonstrates prejudice from trying 
the charged counts together. I.C.R. 14. "When reviewing an order denying a 
motion to sever, the inquiry on appeal is whether the defendant has presented 
facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice resulted from a joint trial, which denied 
the defendant a fair trial." State v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho 903, 908, 55 P.3d 896, 
901 (Ct. App. 2002). The potential sources of unfair prejudice from denial of 
severance are that the jury may have confused and cumulated evidence; the 
potential the defense was confounded in presenting a defense; and the 
possibility the jury convicted based on bad character instead of the evidence 
presented. !9.: A defendant moving to sever has the burden of showing the 
district court that joinder is prejudicial. State v. Dambrell, 120 Idaho 532, 537, 
817 P.2d 646, 651 (1991 ). Even where joinder is ultimately deemed improper, 
harmless error analysis applies. State v. Anderson, 138 Idaho 359, 362, 63 P.3d 
485, 488 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Ramsey has also shown no prejudice from the proper joinder. The district 
court concluded that there would be no confusion of evidence or issues, no 
defenses would be compromised, and appropriate jury instructions would 
minimize any potential prejudice. (R., vol. I, p. 104.) Ramsey simply disagrees 
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with the court's decision. (Appellant's brief, pp. 25-27.) Ramsey has failed to 
show actual prejudice, and therefore failed to show any abuse of discretion. 
Ill. 
Ramsey's Claim Of Excessive Bail Is Not Reviewable On Appeal Because It Did 
Not Affect The Fairness Of The Trial 
A. Introduction 
After filing the complaint, the state requested that bail be set in the amount 
of $250,000. (R., vol. I, p. 37.) The magistrate granted the state's request. (R., 
vol. I, p. 38.) After Ramsey retained private counsel he filed a motion for release 
on his own recognizance or, in the alternative, to reduce the bail amount to 
$10,000. (R., vol. I, pp. 49-50.) Specifically, Ramsey asserted that he had an 
opportunity for a temporary job, family in the area, no adult record, and desired to 
join the military if he was exonerated of the charges. (Id.) The magistrate court 
denied the motion. (R., vol. I, p. 51.) 
After being bound over to the district court Ramsey renewed his motion for 
release or reduction of bail. (R., vol. I, pp. 60-61.) The district court granted the 
motion in part, reducing the bail to $100,000. (R., vol. I, pp. 70-71, 107-08.) 
Ramsey renewed his motion for release on his own recognizance or 
reduction of bail to $10,000. (R., vol. I, pp. 112-22.) The district court denied the 
renewed motion. (R., vol. I, pp. 130-32.) 
On appeal Ramsey renews his claim that he should have been granted 
release or a reduced bail amount. (Appellant's brief, pp. 27-29.) He asserts, for 
the first time on appeal, that had he been released he "possibly" would have 
found two witnesses he believes might have been helpful to the defense. 
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(Appellant's brief, p. 29.) Ramsey's claim of error is not reviewable on appeal 
because he has failed to show that his bail affected the fairness of his trial. 
B. Ramsey Has Failed To Present A Claim That May Be Reviewed On 
Appeal 
"After trial and conviction, questions regarding excessiveness of bail 
generally cannot be raised." Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 824, 702 P.2d 860, 
862 (Ct. App. 1985). The question of whether "excessive bail materially 
interfered with [the defendant's] right to counsel and impeded his defense" may 
be raised after the trial, including on appeal, however. kl In Bitter v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 15, 17 (1967), a judge's order, entered after the start of trial, 
revoking bail and placing the defendant in jail 40 miles away from the courtroom 
because of a "brief incident of tardiness" was held to have been merely punitive 
and, therefore, imposed an unwarranted burden on defendant and his counsel. 
In this case Ramsey never claimed or demonstrated to the district court 
that he in fact was unable to locate defense witnesses due to his inability to meet 
bail. The record contains no evidence that this allegation is factually accurate, 
and the state has had no opportunity to address this claim through presentation 
of evidence. The only citation to the record provided by Ramsey on appeal is 
"Tr. Vol. Ill, p. L." (Appellant's brief, p. 29 (verbatim).) Because Ramsey has 
utterly failed to show any trial prejudice from the district court's setting of the bail 
amount, he has failed to show reviewable, much less reversible, error. 
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IV. 
Ramsey Has Failed To Show Error In The Timing Of The District Court's Order 
Granting State Funds To Hire An Investigator 
Ramsey moved for an investigator at state expense. (R., vol. I, p. 83.) 
The district court denied the motion on October 14, 2009, because Ramsey failed 
to make "a threshold showing that there is a significant factor at trial that requires 
the assistance of an investigator to develop." (R., pp. 100-01.) Ramsey 
requested reconsideration and on October 29, 2009, the district court granted an 
investigator "to locate any potential witnesses who may assist in [Ramsey's] 
defense." (R., pp. 130, 132-33.) 
For the first time on appeal Ramsey asserts that the 15 day delay between 
the initial denial of his motion and the granting of the motion on reconsideration 
prevented him from having a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 29-32.) Because 
Ramsey did not raise this claim below he must demonstrate fundamental error. 
State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). He 
has failed to even claim, much less demonstrate, fyndamental error. 
In the absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to remedy 
that error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the 
defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right 
to a fair trial in a fair tribunal." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 
976 (2010). Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant 
demonstrates that "one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights 
were violated;" (2) the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, 
"without the need for any additional information" including information "as to 
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whether the failure to object was a tactical , and (3) the "defendant must 
demonstrate that the error affected defendant's substantial rights," generally 
by showing a reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the 
trial court proceedings." lil at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Ramsey's claim of 
fundamental error fails on all three of the elements required by Perry. 
First, Ramsey has failed to articulate what constitutional right the district 
court violated by the 15 day delay between denying and then granting the motion 
on reconsideration. Second, the record is far from clear that the 15 day delay 
had anytt-1ing to do with a fair trial. Ramsey's claim of trial prejudice is the barest 
of unsupported speculation. Finally, Ramsey has failed to show prejudice 
because there is nothing in the record before this Court to suggest that an 
investigator would have found additional witnesses in the 15 day period at issue 
or that those witnesses would have ultimately helped the defense at all. Ramsey 
has failed to carry his burden of showing fundamental error. 
V. 
Ramsey's Claim Of Error In Denial Of His Motion For Funds To Hire A 
Psychiatrist Is Not Presented For Appellate Review 
In State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996), the 
Idaho Supreme Court held: 
When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, 
authority, or argument, they will not be considered. Earlier 
formulations of this rule stated that an issue was waived if it was 
not supported with argument and authority. A party waives an 
issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not 
just if both are lacking. Zichko supported this assignment of error 
with argument but no authority. Consequently, he waived this issue 
on appeal. 
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(Citations omitted.) Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) requires that an appellant's 
brief "contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented on appeal [andJ the reasons therefore, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon." Because Ramsey's 
appellate claim that the district court erred by not granting his motion for state 
funds to hire a psychiatrist (Appellant['s brief, pp. 32-33) is lacking in citation to 
the record, citation to any relevant legal authority, and any cogent argument, it is 
not presented for appellate review. 
VI. 
Ramsey Has Shown No Error In The District Court's Exclusion Of Evidence 
Related To The Victims' Sexual History 
A. Introduction 
Prior to trial the prosecution moved to exclude evidence of the victims' 
past sexual behavior. (R., vol. I, p. 157.) The motion was brought after the 
prosecution learned that the defense investigator was investigating "the intimate 
details of the victims' possible past sexual behavior." (Id.; Trial Tr., p. 51, Ls. 3-
23.) The bases of the motion were that the evidence was inadmissible and the 
defense had not complied with its obligations to provide advance notice of intent 
to use such evidence. (R., vol. I, p. 157; Trial Tr., p. 51, L. 23 - p. 52, L. 25.) 
Ramsey's counsel stated that he had no intention of trying to introduce evidence 
of the victims' sexual history and "confess[edJ the motion." (Trial Tr., p. 53, Ls. 3-
20.) The district court granted the motion, stating that it would "assiduously 
apply" the rape shield laws at trial. (Trial Tr., p. 53, L. 21 - p. 54, L. 4.) 
16 
The next day Ramsey's counsel an "Offer P:-oof" and a "Notice of 
Intent to Offer Evidence of Habit" stating that the defense wanted to "offer 
evidence of a habit or routine practice of [S.P.] to drop her pants when she 
desires to have sex with an individual she wants to have sex with." (R., vol. I, pp. 
161, 163 (capitalization altered, redundancy verbatim).) The district court 
concluded the evidence was inadmissible because it did not meet the 
requirements of the rape shield laws and was not timely disclosed. (12/24/09 Tr., 
p. 25, L. 13 - p. 27, L. 18.) 
During the trial the district court also held that references Ramsey made to 
the victim's sexual history during a police interview should, pursuant to its prior 
ruling excluding evidence of the victim's sexual history, be excluded when the 
state presented the recording of that interview as an exhibit (Trial Tr., p. 460, L. 
10 - p. 469, L. 7.) 
On appeal Ramsey contends the evidence of the victim's sexual history 
was admissible because it 11 shows a pattern of behavior that is clearly similar to 
the defendant's account" of the incident (Appellant's brief, p. 34 (internal 
quotation and citation omitted, italics original).) He also asserts the court erred in 
excluding his statements regarding the victim's sexual history during the police 
interview because such statements were "exculpatory." (Appellant's brief, pp. 
37-42.) These arguments fail on the law and the facts. Counsel for Ramsey also 
claims that the district court erred by excluding the evidence because it was 
untimely disclosed, arguing, without citation to the record, that the late disclosure 
of intent to produce testimony of the victim's sexual history should be excused 
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because the evidence was discovered the day the motion was made. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 33.) This appellate claim is contrary to the record and 
irreconcilable with counsel's representations to the district court. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that 
discretion. State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003). 
Questions of relevancy, however, are reviewed de nova. State v. Zichko, 129 
Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996); State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864 
P.2d 596 (1993). 
C. Ramsey Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion Because The 
Proposed Evidence Was Not Admissible 
Admission of evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior is controlled by 
evidence Rule 412. That rule provides that "evidence of a victim's past sexual 
behavior" is not admissible unless the defendant (1) complies with the 
procedures of the rule and (2) admission of the evidence is "constitutionally 
required." I.R.E. 412(b). The procedural prerequisite to admissibility was 
recently set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
The admissibility of I.R.E. 412 evidence is determined solely from 
the basis of the I.R.E. 412 hearing. See I.RE. 412(c)(2)-(3). Under 
I.R.E. 412, evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior is generally 
inadmissible. I.RE. 412(a)-(b). A defendant seeking to introduce 
evidence regarding a sex-crime victim's past sexual behavior is 
required to submit a written offer of proof from which the trial court 
determines if that evidence falls within the limited exceptions for 
admissibility. I.R.E. 412(c)(2). In other words, the trial court 
determines whether it will even consider the admissibility of the 
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evidence based upon the written offer of proof. If the trial 
determines that an I.RE. 412 hearing is warranted, the evidence's 
admissibility is determined from the basis of that hearing alone. 
I.RE. 412(c)(3). 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,216,245 P.3d 961,968 (2010). The Idaho Court 
of Appeals has articulated the constitutional standard as a two-prong test of, first, 
"whether the evidence proffered is relevant" and second, if so, "whether other 
legitimate interests outweigh the defendant's interest in presenting the evidence." 
State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 241, 220 P.3d 1055, 1060 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(quoting State v. Self, 139 Idaho 718, 722, 85 P.3d 1117, 1121 (Ct. App. 2003)). 
Thus, to show error, Ramsey must demonstrate that he presented to the district 
court an offer of proof that established both that the proposed evidence was 
relevant and that its relevance was not outweighed by other legitimate interests. 
The entirety of Ramsey's offer of proof is as follows: 
The Defendant will offer proof, through Jesse Trujillo, that 
Mr. Trujillo had sexual intercourse with [S.P.]. That she was 
aggressive in wanting to have intercourse with him and that at the 
time of the incident she dropped her pants and invited him to "come 
on." 
This evidence is relevant to corroborate the habit or practice 
that Defendant claims she made with him when she invited him to 
have sex with her. 
(R., vol. I, p. 161.) Ramsey's offer of proof utterly fails to show the relevance of 
evidence that the victim had sex with Trujillo on one occasion, that she was 
"aggressive in wanting to have intercourse," that she took off her pants in order to 
have intercourse, and that she uttered the words "come on" on that occasion. 
One incident does not establish a "habit" or "practice" as stated in the written 
offer of proof. Likewise, the offer of proof does not show consent or corroborate 
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Ramsey's version of events as Ramsey argued to the district court. (12/24/09 
Tr., p. 22, L. 24 - p. 23, L. 18.) At best it is evidence of a prior sexual act used 
merely to paint the victim as a person of questionable moral character-the very 
thing prohibited by Rule 412. The district court properly held that Ramsey had 
failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to admission of the evidence under the 
constitutional right exception to the rule. (12/24/09 Tr., p. 25, L. 23 - p. 26, L. 4.) 
D. Ramsey Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion Because The 
Proposed Evidence Was Not Timely Disclosed 
Rule 412 requires the offer of proof "no later than" five days before trial.2 
I.R.E. 412(c)(1). To be excepted from the requirement the defendant must show 
that the evidence is either newly discovered or that the issue to which the 
evidence pertains has newly arisen. Id. Ramsey's offer of proof was filed at 4:32 
p.m. on December 23, 2009 (R., vol. I, p. 161) and the trial was scheduled to 
start at 9:00 a.m. on December 28, 2009 (R., vol. I, p. 137). Because of the 
intervening holiday and weekend, the offer of proof was effectively filed less than 
two days before trial. See I.R.C.P. 6(a) (when time allowed is less than seven 
days, weekends and holidays are excluded). The district court determined 
Ramsey had failed to show that the evidence was newly discovered. (12/24/09 
Tr., p. 27, Ls. 1-4.) 
Compliance with the procedural requirements of Rule 412 is a prerequisite 
to admissibility. Perry, 150 Idaho at 216, 245 P.3d at 968. Because Ramsey 
2 The district court also entered a scheduling order requiring disclosure, 30 days 
before trial, of intent use evidence governed by I.R.E. 412, unless the party could 
show good cause to depart from the schedule. (R., vol. I, p. 139.) 
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comply with the notice requirements of I.R.E. 412(c)(1), the district court 
properly concluded the evidence was inadmissible under that rule. 
Ramsey argues on appeal that the evidence was newly discovered. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 33.) Specifically, counsel asserts that the "specific 
information referred to in the Offer of Proof and Notice of Intent to Offer Habit or 
Practice came to defense counsel's attention after the hearing on the State's 
Motion in Limini [sic]" held the day before. (Appellant's brief, p. 33.3) Counsel's 
representations to this Court are irreconcilable with his representations to the 
district court. At the hearing on the state's motion in limine counsel stated: 
There are some aspects of their [the victim's] past conduct that may 
deal with a form of habit, the habit of one of these alleged victims 
that I don't intend to bring up myself, but it could develop in the 
evidence. I have no intention of myself going into it. And [S.P.], I 
understand, has kind of a reputation for certain types of sexual 
conduct that I had considered bringing up, but I am not going to do 
that. 
(Trial Tr., p. 53, Ls. 9-17.) At the hearing on Ramsey's offer of proof counsel 
stated: 
Well, first of all when we were in court the other day I was talking 
about character evidence. And I think that you will find that in my 
statement I specifically said there was some evidence concerning 
[the victim's] conduct that we might try to offer. This was part of 
that information that I was alluding to. I did not say I would not 
try to offer evidence of habit or evidence that-what I said was that 
I would not-I was not going to offer any evidence of character. 
(12/24/09 Tr., p. 24, L. 23 - p. 25, L. 6 (balding added).) Counsel's 
3 In the brief counsel asserts disclosure occurred September 23, 2009 
(Appellant's brief, p. 33.) The disclosure in fact happened on December 23, 
2009. (R., vol. I, p. 161.) Undersigned counsel assumes this is a typographical 
error. 
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representations to this Court, that the evidence was discovered after the hearing 
on the state's motion, cannot be squared with his representations to the district 
court, that counsel knew about the evidence at the hearing on the state's motion 
but had not decided to offer it at trial. Ramsey has failed to show that the district 
court's determination that Ramsey had failed to prove that the evidence was 
newly discovered, in order to avoid the consequences of the untimely filing, was 
erroneous. 
VII. 
Ramsey Has Failed To Show That He Was Entitled To Access To The Victim's 
Home 
A. Introduction 
Ramsey moved for the court to compel the victim to grant the defense 
access to her house. (R., vol. I, pp. 93-94.) The only authority cited for that 
motion was Idaho Criminal Rule 16(d). (Id.) The prosecutor argued that the 
district court lacked authority to compel the victim to allow persons associated 
with the defense into her house, noting that Rule 16(d) applied only to places in 
the control of the prosecuting attorney. (Trial Tr., p. 24, L. 4 - p. 25, L. 16.) The 
prosecutor stated that the victim was willing to allow the investigating police 
officer to have access and to take photographs and measurements, and that was 
likely to happen in the future. (Trial Tr., p. 25, L. 17 - p. 26, L. 12.) Ramsey 
argued that the rules did allow the court to order access as discovery and that 
measurements of the interior and exterior of the house would be relevant to 
whether the touching was consensual. (Trial Tr., p. 32, L. 11 - p. 37, L. 17.) The 
district court concluded that the discovery rules did not grant it authority to order 
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a non-party to allow the defense access to her property. (R., vol. I, pp. 104-05.) 
On appeal Ramsey argues that the court erred because "[i]n effect, [the victim] 
was undeniably a party to the prosecution." (Appellant's brief, pp. 34-36.) This 
argument fails because it is unsupported by law. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free review. 
State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004); State v. Kavaiecz, 
139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003). 
C. The District Court Lacked Personal Jurisdiction To Force The Victim To 
Submit To An Inspection Of Her Home By The Defense 
"Personal jurisdiction refers to the court's authority to adjudicate the claim 
as to the person. That a court has 'jurisdiction of a party' means either that a 
party has appeared generally and submitted to the jurisdiction, has otherwise 
waived service of process, or that process has properly issued and been served 
on such party." State v. Rodgers, 140 Idaho 223, 227, 91 P.3d 1127, 1121 
(2004). In a criminal case, the court properly acquires jurisdiction over a person 
who appears at the initial court setting on a complaint or arraignment on the 
indictment. Rodgers, 140 Idaho at 228, 91 P.3d at 1122 (citing I.C.R. 4, 10). 
See also State v. Cronin, 923 P.2d 694, 697 (Wash. 1996). 
The Idaho Supreme Court recognized the lack of jurisdiction over a victim 
under indistinguishable facts in State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 877 P .2d 905 
(1994). Babb was charged with murdering Boone in Boone's house. kl at 936-
37, 877 P.2d at 907-08. "Following the state's investigation into Boone's death, 
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the state surrendered possession and control of Boone's residence to Boone's 
father." lg,_ at 936, 877 P.2d at 907. When Babb moved for inspection of the 
premises, the district court denied the request. lg,_ at 936-37, 877 P.2d at 907-
08. The question presented was, "Could the trial court order a party not before 
the court to allow inspection of the residence?" lg,_ at 939, 877 P.2d at 910. The 
Court answered that question in the negative, stating: "Since Babb sought an 
order allowing inspection of Boone's residence, it was critical that Babb bring 
Boone's father before the trial court, giving Boone's father notice and an 
opportunity to respond before the trial court issued an order compelling action by 
Boone's father." lg,_ at 940, 877 P.2d at 911. 
In this case, as did Babb, Ramsey failed to establish the district court's 
personal jurisdiction over the victim. The district court properly ruled that it 
lacked personal jurisdiction to order the victim to allow the defense access to her 
home. 
On appeal, Ramsey asserts that victims are parties in criminal cases 
because they have the right to restitution, the right to be present, the right to be 
heard, and the right to notice of proceedings. (Appellant's brief, pp. 35-36.) This 
argument is specious. By granting the victim certain rights the legislature did not 
make victims parties to the criminal case. Victims do not file pleadings, make 
charging decisions, have control over the presentation of evidence, or have any 
other control over the prosecution of the case. In addition, by definition Boone's 
father was a victim in the Babb case. I.C. § 19-5306(3) (immediate families of 
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homicide victims have full rights under victim's rights statute). Ramsey's attempt 
to distinguish Babb is unpersuasive. 
Because S.P. was never made a party and personal jurisdiction over her 
was never acquired, the district court properly concluded it had no authority to 
force her to submit to an inspection of her home by the defense. In addition, 
Ramsey never established reasonable grounds for the need for such an 
inspection or that he was in any way prejudiced by the lack of personal 
inspection. Ramsey has therefore failed to establish error by the district court. 
VIII. 
Ramsey Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Relevancy Rulings 
A. Introduction 
At trial Ramsey testified that he had no sexual contact with S.P. on the 
night in question. (Trial Tr., p. 693, L. 4 - p. 695, L. 7.) During direct 
examination defense counsel asked Ramsey whether S.P. had ever "suggested 
having a relationship" or asked him for a date in contacts that Ramsey testified 
happened before the date in question. (Trial Tr., p. 652, Ls. 2-15; p. 652, L. 22-
p. 653, L. 1.) The prosecution objected on relevance grounds, and those 
objections were sustained. (Trial Tr., p. 652, Ls. 17-20; p. 653, Ls. 2-4.) 
On appeal Ramsey argues that the evidence was relevant to "Ramsey's 
contention that [S.P.] made the first approach," corroborates his testimony that 
S.P. invited him to the porch, and impeached S.P.'s testimony that she had no 
"significant acquaintance with Ramsey prior to the evening in question." 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 42-43.) Ramsey's argument is without merit. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo. State v. Gomez, 137 Idaho 
671, 674, 52 P.3d 315, 318 (2002); State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 86, 253 P.3d 
754, 760 (Ct. App. 2011 ). 
C. The Proposed Evidence Is Not Relevant 
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant I.R.E. 401, 402. Evidence is 
relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401; State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 
544, 768 P.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1989). Ramsey has failed to show any relevance of 
the proposed evidence. 
!n this case Ramsey's defense was that sexual contact never happened. 
Whether the victim had suggested the potential for a dating relationship in no 
way bolstered his claim that no sexual contact happened. The evidence was 
therefore not relevant to his defense. 
Ramsey claims the evidence was relevant to who "made the first 
approach." (Appellant's brief, p. 43.) He does not explain why who made the 
"first approach" is relevant. Ramsey's defense was that no sexual contact 
occurred, not that there was consensual sexual contact. Ramsey's potential 
testimony that S.P. sought a dating relationship with him before the day in 
question is not relevant to whether sexual contact happened or even whether 
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contact that did happen was consensual.4 to show 
any of this evidence. 
Ramsey next argues that it "corroborate[s]" his claim that he met S.P on 
the back porch by invitation. (Appellant's brief, p. 43.) Whether he met S.P. on 
the porch by invitation is not relevant to whether he subsequently dragged her 
from the porch and tried to rape her. Ramsey has again failed to establish any 
relevance of this evidence. 
Finally, Ramsey argues that the evidence was relevant to impeach S.P.'s 
testimony, citing page 118 of the trial transcript. (Appellant's brief, p. 43.) In that 
page of transcript S.P. testified that she met Ramsey at some point before the 
date in question through a friend who was also friends with an acquaintance of 
Ramsey's. (Trial Tr., p. 118, Ls. 6-24.) Ramsey's claim that the testimony at 
issue would have rebutted this evidence is frivolous. 
4 Even if the evidence could be considered relevant its exclusion was harmless. 
"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence 
unless a substantial right of the party is affected .... " I.R.E. 103(a). See also 
I.C.R. 52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect 
substantial rights shall be disregarded."). '"Where error concerns evidence 
omitted at trial, the test is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the lack of 
excluded evidence might have contributed to the conviction."' State v. Harris, 
132 Idaho 843, 847, 979 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1999) (quoting State v. Pressnall, 119 
Idaho 207, 209, 804 P.2d 936, 938 (Ct. App. 1991)). In this case Ramsey and 
S.P.'s testimony about the events in question is irreconcilable, and therefore this 
case turned primarily on which witness the jury found credible. There is no 
reason to believe that had Ramsey been allowed to testify that S.P. had 
previously inquired about dating the jury's credibility calculus would have been 
different 
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Ramsey has failed to show that the district court erred. His own testimony 
that the S.P expressed interest in a dating relationship was not relevant to the 
defense that there was no sexual contact on the night in question. 
IX. 
Ramsey Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In Jury Selection 
The jury panel was selected and sworn without objection. (12/28/09 Tr., p. 
4, L. 24 - p. 5, L. 2 (reserved defense motion); p. 83, Ls. 7-23 (objection waived); 
p. 82, L. 4 - p. 85, L. 14 Oury seated and sworn).) After the jury was sworn, 
defense counsel stated that the "method by which the jury was selected was 
strange" and asked what rule the trial court relied on "in not calling the 12 initial 
jurors." (12/28/09 Tr., p. 88, L. 24 - p. 89, L. 6.) The trial court explained that 
100 potential jurors were selected from the grand venire and randomly seated for 
the panel for the case. (12/28/09 Tr., p. 89, Ls. 7-20.) On appeal Ramsey 
contends that the jury selection process did not follow applicable rules, though 
what rules were not followed and why Ramsey believes they were not followed is 
unclear. (Appellant's brief, pp. 43-48.) Because no timely objection was raised 
to the trial court, Ramsey has the burden of proving fundamental error on appeal. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (to show 
fundamental error appellate must show constitutional error, clear error, and 
prejudice); State v. Hansen, 127 Idaho 675, 678, 904 P.2d 945, 948 (Ct. App. 
1995) (if "a challenge to a jury panel or an individual juror" is not raised "before 
the jury is empaneled [sic]," the appellant must show fundamental error). 
28 
The allow for a struck jury system, where the jury would be the 
twelve jurors (plus alternates) on the potential jury panel, but when one of 
potential jurors is struck for cause or by peremptory challenge, the next lowest 
number potential juror moves up until twelve jurors plus alternates have been 
passed for cause and peremptorily. I.R. 24(e). The struck jury system was 
followed in this case. (12/28/09 Tr., p. 10, L. 10 p. 12, L. 3; p. 89, Ls. 7-20.) 
The record shows that the district court followed applicable rules. Even if 
the rules had not been followed, there is no constitutional violation, no clear error 
on the record, and no prejudice to Ramsey from the method of jury selection 
employed. Ramsey has shown no error, much less fundamental error, in the 
selection of the jury that heard the case. 
X. 
Ramsey Has Failed To Show That The Evidence Against Him Was Insufficient 
To Support His Convictions 
At trial S.P. testified that Ramsey pulled her from a back porch to the side 
of the house where he pressed her against the wall of the house, told her she 
wanted to do this when she told him she did not, overcame her physical 
resistance and pulled down her pants, grabbed her by the throat and told her he 
would kill her, pinned her to the ground, inserted a finger in her vagina, and tried 
to force his erect penis into her vagina until she screamed for help. (12/28/09 
Tr., p. 148, L. 18 - p. 153, L. 23.) Claiming that "[i]n the final anaiysis, this case 
became a case where the jury was required to decide which of the two parties 
they were to believe," Ramsey argues the evidence was insufficient to prove his 
guilt ,.,._.,,"' ..... the state's evidence was "unreliable." (Appellant's brief, pp. 
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56.) Ramsey's argument is directly contrary to well-established law that the 
Court will not substitute its own credibility determinations for those of the finder of 
fact. State v. Adamcik, Idaho P.3d _, 2012 WL 206006, *9 
(2012) (citing State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724, 170 P.3d 387, 389 (2007)); 
State v. Vargas,_ Idaho_, P.3d 2012 WL 171857, *3 (Ct. App. 
2012) (citing State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,104,822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 
1991 )). This Court must decline Ramsey's invitation to make its own credibility 
determinations. 
XI. 
Ramsey Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error 
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. 
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate 
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error. 
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). In addition, 
cumulative error analysis does not include errors neither objected to nor found 
fundamental. State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010). 
Ramsey has failed to show any error, much less two or more errors. Thus, the 
doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in this case. See, ~. LaBelle v. 
State, 130 Idaho 115, 121, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm 
district court. 
DATED this 24th day of February, 2012. 
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